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Abstract 
Lawrence R. Klein (1920-2013) played a major role in the construction and in the further 
dissemination of econometrics from the 1940s. Considered as one of the main developers and 
practitioners of macroeconometrics, Klein’s influence is reflected in his application of econometric 
modelling “to the analysis of economic fluctuations and economic policies” for which he was awarded 
the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel in 1980. The purpose of this paper 
is to give an account of Klein’s image of econometrics focusing on his early period as an 
econometrician (1944-1950), and more specifically on his period as a Cowlesman (1944-1947). 
Independently of how short this period might appear, it contains a set of fundamental publications and 
events, which were decisive for Klein’s conception of econometrics, and which formed Klein’s unique 
way of doing econometrics. At least four features are worth mentioning, which characterise this 
uniqueness. First, Klein was the only Cowlesman who carried on the macroeconometric programme 
beyond the 1940s, even if the Cowles had already abandoned it. Second, his pluralistic approach in 
terms of economic theory allowed him not only to use the Walrasian framework appraised by the 
Cowles Commission and especially by T.C. Koopmans, but also the Marxian and Keynesian 
frameworks, enriching the process of model specification and motivating economists of different stripes 
to make use of the nascent econometrics. Third, Klein differentiated himself from the rigid 
methodology praised at Cowles; while the latter promoted the use of highly sophisticated methods of 
estimation, Klein was convinced that institutional reality and economic intuition would contribute 
more to econometrics than the sophistication of these statistical techniques. Last but not least, Klein 
never gave up what he thought was the political objective of econometrics: economic planning and 
social reform. 
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Econometrics as a Pluralistic Scientific Tool for Economic Planning: 
On Lawrence R. Klein’s Econometrics2 
 
“Contributions from economics, mathematics, and statistics…at the Cowles were 
obviously important, but I feel that my colleagues wanted results that were quite 
robust, in small confidence areas, and very discriminating among competing 
hypotheses. Quantitative economics is not like that. It is inelegant, very tedious, 
very repetitive, and capable of forward movement in small increment. I admired 
the elegant theorems that my associates produced, but [these] seemed to me…very 
strong and not very realistic. I felt that if one paid unusual attention to data – very 
much in the painstaking tradition of Simon Kuznets – replicated analyses regularly, 
looked at more detail for the economy, learned as much as possible about realistic 
economic reaction, and stayed in touch with the economic situation on a daily basis 
that it would be possible to use econometric models for guidance, both in the fields 
of policy application and in pure understanding of the economy”  
Lawrence R. Klein, 1991 
 
I. Introduction 
Lawrence R. Klein (1920-2013) played a major role in the construction and in the 
further dissemination of econometrics from the 1940s. Considered as one of the main 
developers and practitioners of macroeconometrics (Bjerkholt, 2014a; Mariano, 2008), 
Klein’s influence is reflected in his application of econometric modelling “to the 
analysis of economic fluctuations and economic policies” for which he was awarded 
the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel in 1980. At a first 
glance, Klein’s affiliation to the Cowles Commission during the second half of the 
1940s would suggest a close attachment from his part to the Commission’s views about 
econometrics and to its methods. A more detailed scrutiny shows, however, that Klein 
did not partake of exactly the same image of econometrics of the other members of the 
Cowles3. Contrary to his fellow Cowlesmen, Klein did not envisage econometrics as an 
elegant and outrageously rigorous discipline, but as a sometimes tedious, repetitive and 
messy scientific practice, which involved painstaking analysis of data and economic 
reality, and which provided “guidance, both in the fields of policy application and in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This article was presented at the 46th UK HET Conference in London in September 2014. I am 
grateful to the participants there and especially to Geoffrey Harcourt and to Shobhana Madhavan for 
their comments and suggestions. 
3 To give an account of Klein’s way of doing econometrics I will make use of Leo Corry’s (1989; 2008) 
framework of image and body of knowledge. Rather than focusing on Klein’s theoretical or technical 
contributions to econometrics, I will focus on the way Klein saw econometrics; how he conceived the 
practice of macroeconometric modelling; which elements should be emphasised, in order to improve 
the results; what should be the ultimate political purpose of econometrics; in short, what was Klein’s 
image of knowledge about econometrics. For other applications of Corry’s framework in economics 
see Weintraub (2002) and Giocoli (2003). 
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[the] pure understanding of the economy” (Klein, 1991). The purpose of this paper is 
to give an account of Klein’s particular image of econometrics focusing on his early 
period as an econometrician (1944-1950), and more specifically on his period as a 
Cowlesman (1944-1947). Independently of how short this period might appear, it 
contains a set of fundamental publications and events, which were decisive for Klein’s 
conception of econometrics, and which formed Klein’s unique way of doing 
econometrics4.  
In what follows, I will discuss two features, which characterise Klein’s unique way of 
doing econometrics. First, his pluralistic approach in terms of economic theory, which 
allowed him not only to use the Walrasian framework appraised by the Cowles 
Commission and especially by T.C. Koopmans, but also the Marxian and Keynesian 
frameworks, enriching the process of model specification and possibly motivating 
economists of different stripes to get into the nascent econometrics. Klein did not 
restrict the construction of his econometric models only to one kind of economic 
theory. He demonstrated that it was possible to get the same econometric model 
departing from different theories (Klein, 1947b); but he also showed that several 
economic hypotheses stemming from different economic theories could prove useful 
when specifying an econometric model (Klein, 1950). Second, Klein differentiated 
himself from the rigid methodology praised at Cowles, which promoted the use of 
highly sophisticated statistical methods of estimation. Klein, on the contrary, was 
convinced that the use of a priori information, institutional reality and economic 
intuition would contribute more to econometrics than the further development of these 
sophisticated statistical techniques of estimation (Klein, 1960). 
There are other aspects that characterized Klein’s particular image of econometrics 
that I will not be able to discuss here at length, but that should be kept in mind, for 
they are implicit in most of Klein’s work. First, Klein was the only Cowlesman who 
carried on the macroeconometric programme beyond the 1940s, even if the Cowles 
had already abandoned it (Epstein, 1987; Louçã, 2007; Bjerkholt, 2014b). This point 
illustrates Klein’s persistence and optimism towards econometrics, as a scientific tool 
that would provide sound guidance for policy makers. Second, Klein never gave up 
what he thought was the political objective of econometrics: economic planning and 
social reform. For Klein, econometrics was not only a tool for measuring economic 
variables, understanding and discovering the functioning of the economy, or rendering 
economics more scientific; for him, econometrics was a sound tool providing guidance 
for the objective of economic planning and social reform. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For other accounts of Klein’s life and work, see Bjerkholt (2014a), Klein and Mariano (1987), Bodkin, 
Klein and Marwah (1991), Mariano (2008), Klein (1980), Ball (1981), and Daza and D. Klein (2013a).	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In short, Klein’s image about the relation between econometrics and economic theory 
is quite peculiar when compared to the images of other members of the Cowles, 
notably when compared to the images of Marschak and Koopmans. On the one hand, 
while the Cowles Commission defended what Mirowski (2012) has called the “Cowles 
Creed”, “that Walrasian general equilibrium theory is the only game in town” (p. 160), 
Klein offers a pluralistic approach, making use of different (and even contradictory) 
theories in order to build his econometric models. In the first section I will compare the 
Cowles’s official image of econometrics, i.e. the Cowles Creed, with Klein’s pluralistic 
image. I will show that Klein’s peculiarity resides on the way he built his 
macroeconometric models. In the second section I will give a more detailed discussion 
about Klein’s treatment of the problem of multiple hypotheses, of his criticism about 
the sophisticated methods of estimation, and finally, about his own methodological 
approach to econometrics, namely, his “methodological structuralism” (Nell and 
Errouaki, 2013). 
 
I. Klein’s Pluralism and the “Cowles Creed” 
Klein arrived at the Cowles Commission in November 1944. Jacob Marschak had 
used the occasion of the Econometric Society meeting in Cleveland to personally meet 
and recruit him (Bjerkholt, 2014a, p. 48). With only 24 years of age and with a recently 
acquired PhD degree at the MIT, he was one of the “prodigies” at Cowles (ibid)5. His 
thesis supervisor, Paul A. Samuelson, showed more than high esteem for his first PhD 
student in a letter of recommendation sent to Marschak: 
“He is certainly the best student that I have had, and I have known 
very few better ones…[Klein is a] very promising, able, young 
economist with an excellent training. To a surprising degree he has 
been able to go ahead on his own steam in these disorganizing years” 
(Samuelson to Marschak, October 28, 1944, quoted by Bjerkholt, 
2014a, p. 5). 
Klein arrived at the Cowles Commission as one of the youngest researchers and with 
quite good credentials and recommendations. He was very enthusiastic and his 
humbleness and kindness, which characterised him throughout his whole life 
(Marquez, 1985; Mariano, 2007), rapidly allowed him to integrate to the Cowles’s 
highly dialogical and demanding environment.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Klein was the second youngest researcher at Cowles, since there was also Hermann Rubin “the 
prodigy at Cowles” who was surprisingly only 17 years old in 1944 and already an active member of 
the Commission (Bjerkholt, 2014b, p. 47). 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.80
	   5	  
“[M]y collaborators and myself [Marschak] have found in him a 
person prepared to understand and appreciate the other point of view; 
equally agreeable in giving and in taking; and more interested in 
having the problem solved than in winning the argument or making 
career” (Marschak’s confidential statement for the Social Science 
Research Council, 1945, quoted by Bjerkholt, 2014a).  
Klein was assigned a task that was quite different to the work he had been doing for his 
PhD thesis, The Keynesian Revolution. Although The Keynesian Revolution (Klein, 1947a) was 
a critical book of the theoretical and methodological grounds of Keynes’s works, but 
principally, of The General Theory, in which Klein barely made use of econometrics6, he 
was recruited at the Cowles to remake Tinbergen’s (1939) macroeconometric model of 
the United States. Mirowski (2012) suggests that Klein might not have known very well 
the work of Tinbergen, but he rapidly became an admirer of it7. 
Politically, Klein was left wing oriented and he was perhaps more radical than many of 
his Cowles fellows (Mirowski, 2012; Bjerkholt, 2014b). During his first years at Cowles 
he was a member of the Communist party (Bjerkholt, 2014a; Daza et al., 2013; 
Mariano, 2008); a situation, which brought him several difficulties at the end of the 
1940s inside the Commission8 (Bjerkholt, 2014a; Mirowski, 2012; Louçã, 2007). Klein 
was, then, a particular fellow at Cowles. His particularity, however, does not only have 
to do with his academic and political backgrounds, but it also has to do with his image 
about economic theory and econometrics, and with his practices as an econometrician.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Klein’s critical position towards Keynes can be found throughout the book in quotations like the 
following:  
“Keynes did not really understand what he had written, and chose the wrong thing 
to publicize as his innovation” (Klein, 1947b, p. 83). 
“Keynesian economics gives us a set of tools with which to work on the 
unemployment problem, but it does not deal at all with many other important 
socio-economic questions that also deserve a large share of our attention and study” 
(ibid, p.186). 
In terms of his barely use of econometrics, Klein mentions in some parts of his book that he had 
undertaken some regressions to see if the data fitted with the hypotheses, but he does not give more 
detailed information.  
7 A question that is left open here for further scrutiny is how did Klein conceive Keynes’s (1939) 
criticism of Tinbergen’s work and what was his position on this issue. 
8 His political views also proved troublesome in the mid-1950s, when Klein decided to leave the 
United States “for the peace and academic freedom of Oxford” (Klein in Breit and Hirsch 2004, 
quoted by Mariano, 2008, p. 5). 
“The University of Michigan was to promote Klein to full professorship but then 
reneged when Klein testified in a Detroit hearing that he had been a member of 
the Communist Party for about six months in 1946” (Mariano, 2008, p. 5). 
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The first particularity that I would like to bring to the fore has to do with Klein’s 
pluralistic approach to economic theory. Contrary to the Cowles Commission, Klein 
showed himself throughout his life and especially throughout the years between 1944-
50, as an econometrician willing to confront all the plausible available theories with 
data. For Klein, as I understand, it is not a matter of being a Keynesian, a Marxian, or 
a Neoclassical, whatever this might mean. Abstract theories, of all kinds, provide 
fruitful and pedagogic ways of understanding some of the relationships between the 
variables studied. They provide an idea of the working of the economy, but only its 
confrontation with data can establish the usefulness of the particular theory (or 
hypothesis) in the model specification activity (I will come back to this issue in the 
second section of this paper). But, how does this position contrast with the Cowles’s 
image of econometrics? In order to answer this question I will discuss two important 
events that happened at the Cowles Commission between 1946 and 1947: (1) the 
Measurement without Theory controversy, and (2) the rejection, by Koopmans and 
Marschak of a paper written by Klein, where he clearly defends his pluralistic 
approach. 
 
The methodological and political issues behind the Measurement without Theory Controversy  
The Measurement without Theory Controversy provides an example of the Cowles’s official 
defence of Walrasian theory9. In his review of Burns and Mitchell (1946), Koopmans 
(1947) makes an analogy between the stages of development of economic theory and 
the stages of development of astronomy, i.e. between what he calls the Kepler and the 
Newton stage of development of a determinate science. The Kepler stage of 
development of any science would consist on a phase where researchers are (still) 
concerned with the discovery of the most fundamental relations between the variables, 
in order to understand the observed phenomena. Any discipline that would find itself 
in this stage would need of a great deal of purely observational and descriptive work. 
On the contrary, if a scientific field had reached the Newton stage of development, this 
would mean that there would exist a fundamental and general theory that would count 
as an explanation of the most “elementary and general” relations between the 
variables studied. 
“The conviction that this ‘law’ [Newton’s law of Gravitation] is in 
some sense more fundamental, and thus constitutes progress over the 
Kepler stage, is due, I believe, to its being at once more elementary 
and more general. It is more elementary in that a simple property of 
mere matter is postulated. As a result, it is more general in that it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 For detailed accounts of the Measurement without Theory Controversy, see Morgan (1990) and P. Epstein 
(1999). See also Koopmans (1947) and Vining (1949) for the original texts of the controversy. 
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applies to all matter, whether assembled in planets, comets, sun or 
stars, or in terrestrial objects – thus explaining a much wider range of 
phenomena”  (Koopmans, 1947, p.161). 
Burns and Mitchell – and the researchers at the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) – would be in the Kepler stage, while the Cowles Commission 
(which based its studies in the Walrasian framework) would be in the Newton stage of 
development.  
“It appears to be the intention of Burns and Mitchell – in any case it is 
the opinion of the present reviewer – that their book represents an 
important contribution to the ‘Kepler stage’ of inquiry in the field of 
economics10” (Koopmans, 1947, pp. 161-162). 
This means that the researchers of the NBER were still immersed in the task of 
searching for the establishment of the most empirical regularities between the 
economic variables. The Cowles’s researchers, in contrast, had already solved this 
problem, and they knew which were the most fundamental relations underlying 
economic variables and phenomena. The Walrasian general-equilibrium framework 
had provided them with that answer, and so, the Cowles did not have the necessity of 
dealing with the problem of multiple hypotheses. There was only one type of hypothesis 
that one could take for granted in the building of econometric modelling: this type of 
hypotheses stemmed from Walrasian economics11. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Two things are worth noticing here. First, Koopmans had received an academic formation as a 
physicist, not as an economist. He even developed a theorem during his very early years as a natural 
scientist, which rendered him well known in quantitative chemistry: the Koopmans theorem. Second, it is 
also of interest to notice that R. Vining (the young NBER standard bearer in the Controversy) did not 
refute Koopmans’s analogy between the stages of development in economics and astronomy. Even if 
he did not accept that Walrasian theory could be treated as the equivalent of Newton’s theory in 
economics, he did neither refute comparing economics to the natural sciences, nor did he refute the 
notion of progress underlying the Kepler and the Newton stage framework. This position is quite 
representative of the image of economics of the time, consisting on the consideration that economics 
should more and more converge to the natural sciences in order to “progress”. Nevertheless, the 
classification of Newton’s Law of Gravitation as “the most fundamental” and applying “to all matter” 
would not be very accurate from the perspective of the natural scientists, since Quantum Mechanics 
had, by 1947, already “revolutionised” physics and our understanding of matter. 
11 Qin (1993) provides a quite different story about the problem of multiple hypotheses and of the 
underlying reasons explaining why the Cowles disregarded this problem. 
“Since the central task of the Cowles Commission was to formalize the statistical 
methods applicable for econometric analyses, given economic theory, they 
consciously left open the issue of how to put particular economic theory into a 
particular structural model” (Qin, 1993, p. 63). 
I think that Qin misses the point here, because for the Cowles there was no doubt that the “given 
economic theory” could be no other than the Walrasian general-equilibrium framework. They did not 
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Klein’s position towards the controversy is also worth mentioning, for, although he did 
not really play an active role in it, he felt some of the consequences of the controversy 
in his short stay at the NBER, in 1948. For him, for instance, the controversy was not 
exclusively methodological, but the political element also played an important role12. 
“As a visiting staff member of the National Bureau during 1948-49, I 
could sense the tension in the dispute over methodology. It was not 
purely methodological, however. A central issue was that we members 
of the Cowles Commission were seeking an objective that would 
permit state intervention and guidance for economic policy, and this 
approach was eschewed by…the National Bureau” (Klein, 1991, p. 
112). 
Although closer to the Cowles than to the Bureau in political terms, in terms of 
methodology, Klein very much admired the work of the NBER and appreciated the 
fact that researchers such as Kutznets (and presumably Burns and Mitchell) attributed 
so much importance to the role of data in the analysis of the business cycle.  
“I felt that if one paid unusual attention to data – very much in the 
painstaking tradition of Simon Kuznets – … that it would be possible 
to use econometric models for guidance, both in the fields of policy 
application and in pure understanding of the economy” (Klein, 1991).  
Klein felt that the main dispute between the NBER and the Cowles Commission had 
to do with their distinct political positions rather than with methodological issues. 
While the NBER was closer to the Department of Economics of the University of 
Chicago, and hence, was more reticent in the promotion of governmental intervention, 
the members of the Cowles Commission were more left wing oriented and so, they 
would promote government intervention to steer the economy. This, however, does 
not mean that the Cowlesmen were Keynesians (Miroswki, 2012), but just that they 
favoured intervention. 
But intervention alone (be it inspired by Keynes or Tinbergen) would not satisfy Klein. 
For Klein thought that the social and economic problems were so profound that they 
had to be resolved at its roots. In his 1947 book – The Keynesian Revolution – Klein 
described, in general terms, “a practical program[me] of economic policy … necessary 
in order to reform capitalism to a system of full employment” (Klein, 1947b, p. 168, my 
emphasis). This programme had a Marxian (and not a Keynesian) flavour, since it was 
Marx’s ultimate aim (and not Keynes’s) which would satisfy Klein’s image about 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
leave the issue open, but they closed it before one could even think about it (see the letter that I quote 
in page 9 from Koopmans to Marschak). 
12 A third aspect worth of analysis in this controversy is the battle for funding between both institutions, 
treated in more detail by Mirowski (2002; 2012). 
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intervention. For Klein, Marx’s aim was to “analy[s]e the reasons why the capitalist 
system could not function properly, while Keynes analy[s]ed the reasons why the 
capitalist system did not but could function properly. Keynes wanted to apologi[s]e 
and preserve, while Marx wanted to criticize and destroy” (ibid, p. 131). For Klein the 
positions of Marx and Keynes were opposed; the former would be a revolutionary and 
the latter a reformer. Although Klein favoured income distribution policies, he 
demonstrated, following Marxian arguments, that this policy would not be sufficient 
“to insure that capitalism will always provide uninterrupted full production and 
employment” (Klein, 1947a, p. 131).  
“Full-employment planning (functional finance or compensatory fiscal 
policy) is not enough” (Klein, 1948, “The case of Planning”, quoted 
by Mirowski, 2012, p. 149).  
“Complete planning leads generally to a higher level of welfare than 
perfect competition even in the case where wealth redistribution is 
permitted in the latter system” (ibid, p. 149). 
 
The way to sell econometrics to anybody is first to sell modern economic theory, then to sell econometric 
methods 
In 1946 Klein had written a paper where he attempted at a comparison of Walrasian, 
Keynesian and Marxian theories of effective demand, in order to show that one could 
arrive to the same conclusions and build the same model, starting form any of the 
three theories13. This procedure, however, did not please Koopmans who advised 
Marschak not to publish that paper under the name of the Cowles Discussion Paper 
series. Klein, Koopmans argued, was not exclusively using “modern theories of 
economic behavio[u]r”, i.e. Walrasian general equilibrium theory, and this argument 
was enough for rejecting Klein’s paper: 
“This paper [Theories of effective Demand and Employment] is an attempt to 
sell the idea of econometric model building to adherents of Marxian 
economic doctrine. I shall explain in these comments why I believe 
that such attempts, including the present one, are harmful to the objectives of 
econometric model building. The main reason is that econometric research 
of the type in which we are engaged in is essentially based on modern 
theories of economic behavio[u]r. The way to sell it to anybody, including 
Marxian economists, is first to sell modern economic theory, then to sell econometric 
methods. There are no short cuts” (Koopmans to Marschak, memo 
December 10, 1946, box 148, folder Klein, Jacob Marschak’s Papers, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 In fact the original title of the paper was “Marxian Theory of Effective Demand”, and in its first 
version the paper did not include the Keynesian framework (Bjerkholt, 2014b).  
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quoted in Mirowski, 2002, p. 247, my emphasis).   
Koopmans’s position shows that the Cowles’s aim was first to promote Walrasian 
theory, and then econometrics. It would make no sense to promote econometrics 
without the Walrasian framework, since only that particular framework would act as 
warrantor of an accurate use of econometrics. This means, that econometrics would be 
only then dealing with the most advanced “modern economic theory” and not with 
any other kind of forgotten pseudo-theory. In short, the Cowles Commission did not 
only seek to provide a powerful scientific tool for economists, but to promote the 
Walrasian framework and then to reinforce this framework by means of econometrics. 
Klein’s image and method was, under these lines, not always in accordance with the 
aims and methods of the Cowles. 
The refusal of Klein’s paper and Koopmans’s position in the Controversy not only 
show that the Commission was advocating for the promotion of Walrasian theory, but 
it also points to the divergences between Klein and the Cowles. On the one hand, the 
refuted paper is an indication of Klein’s characteristic pluralism, which does not always 
seem to fit very well with the rigid position of the Cowles towards economic theory. 
On the other hand, Koopman’s definition of the Walrasian framework as the most 
advanced and complete economic theory, clearly contrasts with the more flexible and 
pragmatic approach appraised by Klein, characterised by his use of economic 
hypotheses, stemming from different economic theories to complete and estimate his 
models. The second section of this paper will attempt to give a more detailed account 
of Klein’s image of econometrics and of his methodology. 
 
II. Klein and the Building of Macroeconometric Models 
Two ways of dealing with multiple hypotheses at the Cowles Commission 
I have mentioned that, for the Cowles, the problem of multiple hypotheses was already 
solved, since economics counted with the most general and fundamental theory 
explaining economic phenomena: Walrasian general equilibrium theory. The real 
problem to which the Cowles was confronted in its econometric venture was, as 
Mirowski (1989) puts it, to verify “the validity of neoclassical theory, and not all theory 
tout court”. Their task as econometricians would primarily consist on the testing of the 
neoclassical hypotheses, very much in the spirit of some early econometricians of the 
1910s, such as Lenoir or Lehfeldt who were occupied in testing whether “the 
assumptions in the theoretical demand model were actually fulfilled in the statistical 
data” (Morgan, 1990, p. 141), but several years after them and armed with more 
sophisticated statistical and mathematical techniques. 
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Inside the Cowles, however, there was another way of dealing with the problem of 
multiple hypotheses. Klein, who regarded the question of multiple hypotheses as 
anything but a problem, led this other alternative way of dealing with multiple 
hypotheses. In fact, he seemed to be willing to make his readers aware of the existence 
of multiple hypotheses, and then to make the most of it in order to build his 
econometric models. 
“It is desired to impress upon the reader that the models of this volume are 
put forth in full knowledge of the existence of the problem of multiplicity 
of hypotheses” (Klein, 1950, p. 122). 
I come back to Klein’s 1946 paper (rejected by Marschak and Koopmans), Theories of 
Effective Demand and Employment. This paper, published one year later, in 1947, in the 
Journal of Political Economy, is a good example of the way Klein made use of different 
economic theories. The paper was about the possibility of building the same 
econometric model on the bases of any of the following theories: Neoclassical, Marxian 
or Keynesian14. Three years later, in 1950, when his first celebrated econometric book 
appeared, Klein insisted on his pluralistic way of building macroeconometric models:  
“Many economists will recognize the resemblance between the three-
equation model [Klein’s celebrated Model I], Kalecki’s models of the 
business cycle, and some of the doctrines of Marxist economics. The 
model could actually be called a Marxian theory of effective demand. 
It is possible to develop this model, as we have shown, from the un-
Marxian principles of utility and profit maximization [Klein, 1950], 
but it is also possible to develop this model from purely Marxian 
principles [Klein, 1947a]. The same model can be consistent with a 
multiplicity of hypotheses. The problem of developing models from 
Marxian principles is of great interest from the point of view of the 
history of economic thought, but is not an essential problem of this 
book, which is concerned mainly with quantifying a true description of 
the structure of [the] United States economy. We mention this 
relation only in passing, as a point of general interest15” (Klein, 1950, 
pp. 63-64). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 De Vroey and Malgrange (2009) present serious doubts about the Keynesian spirit of Klein’s 
models. In particular, they argue that Klein’s “claim that he empirically demonstrated the validity of 
Keynes [sic] involuntary unemployment hypothesis is ill-grounded” (De Vroey et al., 2009, p. 1).  
15 Note that Klein adopts a quite defensive tone is his claims. He asserts that this problem would only 
be interesting from the point of view of the history of economic thought, and he dismisses it. It is worth 
remembering that, by 1950, Klein was not a member of the Cowles anymore and that the econometric 
programme had already lost much of its earlier personal enthusiasm, as well as its financial and 
institutional support. In fact, the Cowles Monograph 11 was the result of Klein’s work at the Cowles in 
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In his 1947 paper and in his 1950 book, Klein defends a fundamental idea that reflects 
his image of econometrics. He wants to convince the reader that irrespective of the 
economic beliefs that econometricians might have, econometrics should be a tool 
capable of leading the researchers to the same conclusions: 
“It is desirable to provide tools of analysis suited for public economic 
policy that are, as much as possible, independent of the personal 
judgements of a particular investigator. Econometric models are put 
forward in this scientific spirit, because these models should lead all 
investigators to the same conclusions, independent of their personal 
whims” (Klein, 1947a, p. 111). 
Klein’s (1950) celebrated Model I is then a good example of this model-building 
procedure. This simple model consisted of “a completely determined system 
containing three statistical equations (i.e. three equations involving random terms and 
unknown parameters) plus some definitions or identities” (Klein, 1950, p. 58). The 
model had the following form: 
(1)   ! =  ∝!+∝! ! +∝! Π + !!   
(2) ! = !! + !!Π + !!Π!! + !!!!! + !! 
(3) ! = !! + !!! + !!Y!! +   !!t+ !! 
(4) ! = ! + ! + ! 
(5) ! = Π +! ≡ 
(6) Δ! = ! 
Where ! is consumption, ! is the wage bill, Π  is non-wage income (profit), ! is net 
investment, ! is output, ! is time and ! are the goods demanded by the government 
and foreigners. All variables are expressed in constant dollars. 
Let us just take one equation – the investment function (2) – as an illustration of Klein’s 
way of constructing his models. Since, according to Klein, in both the Classical and the 
Keynesian cases, the investment function is derived from the principles of profit-
maximization, I will first describe the construction of equation (2) from these points of 
view, and then, I will come back to describe the Marxian path leading to that 
equation. 
“… the methodologies of classical and Keynesian economics do not 
differ… Both theories are based on… business-firm profit- (or utility-) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1947, not in 1950 (Bjerkholt, 2014b). Koopmans had already occupied the research directorship of the 
Cowles at that moment. 
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maximization to get the demand for producer goods, labo[u]r and 
business cash-holdings” (Klein, 1947b, p. 117). 
The principle of utility-maximization gives Klein the possibility of developing equation 
(2) by going along two different ways. On the one hand, he can derive it from “the 
heuristic principle…that profits are the mainspring of economic action in a capitalist 
society. Entrepreneurs expand when profits are anticipated to be high and contract 
when profits are anticipated to be low” (Klein, 1947b, p. 60), and so, Klein establishes 
a positive relation between investment ! and (expected) profits, which depends upon 
profits today Π, and precedent profits Π!!. “However, not only the absolute size of 
profits but also their relation to the existing stock of capital is important; hence the 
variable !!! is introduced” (Klein, 1950, p. 60). 
The other way he goes along to derive equation (2) is by dividing the economy into two 
social groups: “workers and capitalists” or, in this case, rather consumers and 
producers, and assuming that they attempt to maximise their respective satisfactions. 
In short, going along this way, Klein first looks into the behaviour of the individuals 
within the social classes, and then aggregates their individual equations in order to get 
the total demand for investment goods. The consumers’ satisfactions depend upon the 
current and future consumption of household goods and services, while the producers’ 
“satisfactions depend upon the use of current and future consumer goods and services 
and also upon the consumption of producer goods in their possession…The income of 
[producers] can be used for two purposes, to spend on consumer goods and to spend 
on producer goods. They derive ‘pleasure’ from both types of spending” (Klein, 1950, 
pp. 60-61). Producers’ utility-maximization can lead, then, to equation (7), which 
represents the demand for producer goods: 
(7) !! = !!! + !!!!! + !! 
Taking into account that in the classical world the use of capital is represented by  
 ! = !(!, !!!) 
Klein arrives at the individual’s equation of investment (8). 
(8) !! = !!!      ∗ + !!!        ∗!! + !!!        ∗(!!)!! + !! 
If the latter equation is aggregated over all firms, it becomes equivalent to equation (2). 
Note, however, that Klein’s way of aggregating individuals’ behaviour was also of a 
special kind. Because of its importance I will not be able to give a thorough discussion 
of his method of aggregation, but I cannot just leave this point without any comment. 
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Paul Samuelson (1983) denoted Klein’s approach as Envelope Aggregation16. Rather 
than deriving a macroeconomic theory from the mere aggregation of microeconomic 
theory, Klein took “the existing macro and micro theories as given and then 
measur[ed] the economic variables in a way that aim[ed] to insure consistency 
between both sets of theories…The distinguishing feature of Klein’s approach is that 
measurement is what is endogenous rather than theory” (Marquez, 1985, p. 3). 
In the case of deriving the investment equation from Marxian principles, Klein 
recognises that Marx’s equations do not represent complete systems of equations but 
mainly definitions, and so, he “search[es] through Marx’s literary explanations and 
numerical examples for the strategic  hypotheses that will produce a determinate 
system of equations” (Klein, 1947b, p. 120).  
“Our model is intended as an extension of the Marxian analysis to a 
logical conclusion in terms of a theory of effective demand. Actually, 
Marx laid the groundwork for a complete equation system to 
determine the level of income (effective demand) but did not build the 
complete system” 
Furthermore, Klein recognises the methodological differences between the Marxian 
and the classical and Keynesian cases.  
“The methodology of the Marxian approach is quite different from 
that of Keynes and the Classics: Instead of studying the behavio[u]r of 
individuals, Marx studies the behavio[u]r of classes directly…the 
Marxian system of macroeconomics differs essentially from the 
Keynesian and classical systems. The macrounits in the latter systems 
are producers and consumers, and this overlapping fails to bring out 
some essentials. The macrounits of the Marxian system are not only 
producers and consumers but also workers and capitalists. The latter 
two groups are, practically speaking, exclusive, and their basic conflict 
of interests can more easily be singled out as one of the moving forces 
in the system” (Klein, 1947b, p. 118).   
In the case of the Marxian determination of the demand for investment goods he 
follows two steps: first, he “deriv[es]  the demand relation for constant capital (capital 
used up) according to Marx and then transform[s] the demand for constant capital 
into investment” (ibid., p. 120). Since workers only demand consumer goods in the 
Marxian system, the demand for constant capital is based entirely on the behaviour of 
capitalists. Klein, then, searches for Marx’s numerical examples in Volume II of Das 
Kapital to establish the form of the Marxian demand for investment goods. First, the 
demand for investment goods will only depend upon the behaviour of capitalists, since 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For a comprehensive discussion of Klein’s aggregation methods see Klein (1946a; 1946b; 1950) and 
Hoover (2012). 
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workers buy only consumer goods. Since, as Marx explains, capitalists in Department I 
(the producer-goods industry) spend from surplus value ! on constant capital !, then, 
Klein obtains the following equation17: 
(9) ! = !! + !!! 
Klein, then, attempts at a transformation of this equation in order to work with the 
variable ! instead of !. He denotes the capital acquired during the pth preceding time 
period by !!! and he becomes: 
(10) ! = !(!, !!!, !!!, !!!… ) 
Making a linear transformation of (10) he gets: 
(11) ! = !! + !!! + !!!!! + !!!!!+. .. 
And because of the impossibility of statistically measuring in a separate way the capital 
purchased during every preceding period, Klein approximates all these variables by 
means of a proxy variable, representing all the capital accumulated until the period 
under consideration (Klein, 1950): 
(12) ! = !! + !!! + !!!!!! 
Furthermore, he writes the stock of existing fixed capital in terms of the net investment 
of all preceding periods as: 
(13) !!! = !!!!!!!!  
And because it is net investment, rather than gross investment, which interests him, 
Klein writes:  
(14) ! = ! + ! 
The next two steps before arriving at the final result are simple algebra. He substitutes 
(14) in (12), and gets: 
(15) ! = !! + !!(! + !)+ !!!!!! 
And finally, he replaces (9) in (15), getting: 
(16) ! = !! + !!! + !!!!! 
Note that equation (16) is equivalent to our original investment equation (2). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 I keep Klein’s (and Marx’s) original notation, where ! is constant capital, not consumption. 
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Beyond the algebra and the simple and elegant mathematical final form of the 
Marxian, Keynesian and (Neo)classical model of effective demand, the important point 
is that Klein gets at the same equations and at the same model departing from three 
different theories. Klein recognises, however, that he could have gotten many different 
model specifications from each of the theories and that he had to do a careful selection 
of the parts of the theory that would be useful for his particular task.  
“…we have not utilized Marx’s methods to their fullest extent. Only 
those aspects of Marx’s theories are used that are necessary to build a 
complete system of equations. Many Marxian theories are unrelated 
to the principle of effective demand, but even some of those parts of 
his theory that are related to effective demand have been left out” 
(Klein, 1947a, pp. 125-126). 
He carried on the transformations of the equations and he expressed the hypotheses in 
a peculiar way, so that he could get the same equations in the end. But he did not just 
pick up any hypotheses carelessly. He actually confronted each hypothesis with data, 
and he used its good fit as a criterion to reject or accept it. 
“Many of the parts of the Keynesian system have withstood the test of 
being consistent with observed data” (Klein, 1947a, p. 116) 
“…the author has applied various methods of statistical estimation to 
the Marxian model and has found the estimated parameters to be very 
reasonable in size. Moreover, the model fits the observed data very 
closely” (ibid, p. 127). 
In short, Klein based the construction of his models on the multiplicity of hypotheses. 
In his process, which appears quite close to that proposed by Boumans (1999; 2005) 
Klein “backed” his models using different bits and pieces of distinct theories as 
“ingredients” for his model construction. Klein did not follow any well-defined recipe. 
He developed mathematical models of the economy as a whole based on hypotheses of 
different (and sometimes opposed) economic theories; he then, confronted these 
hypotheses to data, retaining those, which seemed to fit the observations. Although I 
did not describe Klein’s confrontation of the hypotheses with data, one can imagine 
that the whole process of model specification was inevitably accompanied by an 
activity characterised by arduous work, consisting on a tedious, repetitive and 
sometimes even disappointing task. Tinkering might quite well describe Klein’s 
econometric modelling activity. 
Painstaking effort and disappointing results of the Cowles’s methods of estimation 
Not only the original workers of Marschak’s econometric programme, like Koopmans, 
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Hurwicz or Marschak himself, eventually abandoned econometrics. Also the Cowles 
Commission ceased to pay attention to econometrics and, especially, to 
macroeconometric model building (Klein, 1991; Epstein, 1987; Mirowski, 2002; 2012). 
The effort of the Cowles Commission to regain attractiveness for funding might be 
partly responsible for this abandonment (Mirowski, 2002; 2012). Yet, there is another 
part of the story that has to do with more technical reasons, which accounts for the loss 
of enthusiasm and faith in the programme.  
Econometrics à la Cowles was much of a painstaking activity with “three joint lines of 
interest: 1. economics, 2. statistics, [and] 3. mathematics” (Klein, 1991, p. 109). These 
lines of interest, combined with the high ambitions of the Cowles, were not necessarily 
comfortable subjects to work at, for they constituted the source of a painstaking 
activity, supposing heavy mathematical and statistical work, long and tedious 
calculations, repetitions, many disappointments, drawbacks and the remaking of the 
econometric exercise all anew again and again (Klein, 1991). The emphasis that each 
author placed on the different lines of research tells us lot about the images that every 
econometrician had about econometrics. As we have seen from the Measurement 
without Theory controversy, Koopmans accorded more importance to the lines of 
interest “statistics” and “mathematics”. Klein, however, accorded more importance to 
the line of interest of economics as I will show further on. 
One has also to imagine that the technical possibilities of doing calculations at the time 
were completely different from the ones we know today. Without the aid of advanced 
calculation machines such as the digital computer, “elaborate calculations were slow, 
complex and awkward to carry out” (Mirowski, 2012, p. 147). The research field of 
econometrics was then seen as an activity that needed of a teamwork effort to be 
successfully fulfilled, partly because of the burdensome calculations. The team 
assembled by Marschak at the Cowles Commission was divided in a specific way, 
where each worker was in charge of an explicit task, so that the team could work out 
the complex solutions in the most efficient way18. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Klein gives a very clear account of the division of labour within the Cowles Commission: 
“When [Marschak] recruited [Klein], it was explicitly to prepare model 
specifications according to received theory...In addition [he] was assigned 
the task of data preparation and model estimation/testing...[Tygvre] 
Haavelmo was recruited to work on econometric theory, Theodore 
Anderson to work on the underlying theory of mathematical statistics, 
Koopmans to work on overseeing all the pieces but especially on 
implementation of the work, through computation that was very complicated 
and tedious, given available facilities of the day. Herman Rubin worked on 
econometric theory and mathematical statistics; Leonid 
Hurwicz...contributed to all aspects of the work; Roy Leipnik was a 
mathematical statistician for the project. Don Patinkin was assigned work on 
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When the programme was taking off by 1944, Marschak claimed that the Cowles 
would deliver powerful new results for economic analysis in just three years (Klein, and 
Mariano 1987; Klein, 1991). Nevertheless, the results of the first macroeconometric 
models did not prove very convincing, not only within the Cowles, but also in the other 
institutions based at Chicago and in Washington19. 
Inside the Cowles, Marschak’s reactions in respect to the results of Klein’s models were 
quite clear. “As early as 1946...Marschak...did not wish to claim much for Klein’s early 
efforts” (Epstein, 1987, p. 105): 
“The present admittedly very crude and preliminary results were tentatively 
applied to measuring the effects of policies; though it may have been 
wiser not to include the discussion even in a privately circulated 
monograph”20 (Marschak, 1946, quoted by Epstein, 1987, p. 105, my 
emphasis). 
Carl Christ, was hired by Koopmans “to clean up the Klein model, re-estimate it for 
the period 1921-47, and [to try to] ‘do it right’ from the Cowles perspective” 
(Mirowski, 2012, p. 156). But he did not get promising results either. In the conference 
on business cycles held at the NBER at the end of 1949, Christ’s results were heavily 
criticised by prominent economists such as Friedman, Leontief, Hildreth or Metzler. 
Even economists who had actively participated in the conception of the model – like 
Klein, Marschak and Koopmans – showed themselves sceptic about the results 
(Epstein, 1987; Mirowski, 2012). It was, in any case, the prelude of the end of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
a sectoral model for manufacturing, but drifted more towards an interest in 
the underlying Keynesian macrotheory” (Klein, 1991, pp. 109-110). 
19 Albert Hart, a member of the Committee for Economic Development (CED), convinced Marschak 
and Klein to present, in 1945, the projections of their macroeconometric model to the Bureau of 
Budget, the Department of Commerce and the Federal Reserve Board. Klein was not very enthusiastic 
at the beginning because he not only thought that his results were too preliminary, but also because he 
thought that the results would be very pessimistic (Klein, 1991). “To [his] surprise, this first exercise, 
though premature, was very bullish” (Klein, 1991, p. 114). However, the reaction of the governmental 
agencies in Washington was not very optimistic. “The Cowles-CED projections were not taken 
seriously; the response in all cases was that we should wait until mid year 1946, when we would find 6 
million unemployed again and a return to [the] conditions of the Great Depression” (Klein, 1991, pp. 
114-115). The general belief of the U.S. economists that the economy would fall back into a slump 
period after World War II, might explain this negative reaction to the Cowles-CED projections. If the 
Cowles projections were not being taken seriously by the governmental agencies it was because the 
Commission lacked credibility, and not because her methods were rudimentary or not robust enough. 
20 Klein was of course aware of the scepticism that his macroeconometric modelling results provoked 
in the Cowles’s directorship. With hindsight he described the situation in the following way: 
“In general, the senior researchers at the Commission were not satisfied with the 
performance of models that had been constructed during the expansionary phase 
of the research program[me] and there was relatively little carry-on activity in 
empirical model building with repeated applications over sustained time periods” 
(Klein, 1991, p. 115). 
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econometric programme at Cowles, which driven by new (military) funding, was being 
directed towards different fields of research, especially towards activity analysis 
(Mirowski, 2002). But Christ himself had also a thing or two to say about Klein’s 
model. He described Klein’s predictions of the price level and disposable income for 
1941 as “absurd” (Epstein, 1987), and hence, his criticism reinforced the general 
pessimism about macroeconometric empirical work from within the very Cowles 
Commission21.  
Klein himself had been quite self-critical about his models. Not so much about his 
results, though, but especially about the estimation methods promoted at Cowles. With 
hindsight, Klein would recognize that it was not the methods developed at Cowles 
during the 1940s, which should be credited for the increase of the accuracy and 
usefulness of econometrics: 
“If econometric results are today more useful than in the past, this is 
only partly a result of the particular method of estimation but much 
more significantly a product of painstaking research of a more 
pedestrian nature...I would expect marginal improvements of five or 
ten per cent through the use of more powerful methods of statistical 
inference...The adoption of more powerful methods of mathematical statistics is 
no panacea” (Klein, 1960, p 867, my emphasis). 
“Great faith was placed on the ability of sophisticated statistical 
methods, particularly those that involved advanced mathematics, to 
make significant increments to the power of econometric analysis. I 
[Klein], personally, place more faith on the data base, economic 
analysis (both institutional as well as theoretical), political insight, and 
attention to the steady flow of information” (Klein, 1991, pp. 113-114) 
Another recurrent criticism of the Cowles’s methods of estimation increased the 
scepticism about the structural econometrics programme. It was not clear for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21  Other criticisms also reinforced the pessimistic environment towards structural econometrics. 
Herman Wold (1951), for instance, “continued to question the logical status of causality in the 
simultaneous model. Robert Solow (1951) wanted an explanation for why simultaneous equations 
estimators and OLS estimators seemed to yield similar results in practice...In an obscure review 
written in German, Tinbergen[‘s]...comments read as a most diplomatic refusal to endorse the new 
methodology” (Epstein, 1987, p. 112) not to mention Friedman’s (1957; 1958a; 1958b) criticisms, also 
documented in Epstein (1987). Theil (1954) “outlined a theorem showing that the generalized variance 
of least-squares estimates of the parameters in a single equation is at least as small as that of limited-
information- maximum-likelihood estimates” (Klein, 1956, p. 217). And, of course, also the NBER 
members attacked the lack of results of the Cowles methods: 
“[T]he only satisfactory test of the usefulness of [the Cowles] methods is their fruits, 
and these have not yet been attained, or if attained, have not yet been made 
generally available” (Vining, 1949, p. 77). 
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economists why they should adhere to the methods of estimation like the maximum-
likelihood-method (MLM) or the limited-information-maximum likelihood method 
(LIML), when more pedestrian methods such as the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
seemed to generate equally accurate results with a considerable amount of less effort. 
Economists, as prominent as Robert Solow, expressed their doubts about the 
superiority of the Cowles’s methods. 
“Robert Solow (1951) wanted an explanation for why simultaneous 
equations estimators and OLS estimators seemed to yield similar 
results in practice. Solow was also of the opinion that ‘when they 
differ, good sense often favo[u]rs least squares’” (Epstein, 1987, p. 
112). 
Beyond the technical issues largely discussed in Klein (1956; 1960) and Epstein (1989), 
it is worth noting that the economic community was just not convinced that they 
should undertake such a painstaking effort in order to get some results that seemed to 
be just as good as those obtained by means of more pedestrian methods. Not every 
economist had the possibility of embracing such a burdensome task, since 
macroeconometric modelling needed of a great amount of institutional and financial 
support, the disposition and eagerness to undertake tedious and teamwork-based work, 
and some kind of warranty that the results would return the sweat, the trouble and the 
time invested, proving its usefulness in governmental affaires (or in the industry, as 
Klein would show from the 1960s). 
In short, Klein resumes the key message of the experience of the econometric 
programme at Cowles in the following paragraph: 
“Important lessons to be learned from the Cowles Commission 
experience are that statistical consistency or unbiasedness is not the 
most important property of estimators; precision is associated much 
more with variance or efficiency. It is possible to trade consistency for 
error variance and come out ahead. It is important to grasp the 
simultaneity of the macroeconomy but not necessarily to tie statistical 
estimation methods exclusively to this property. It is more important to be 
able to update, correct, or revise estimates on the basis of a steady flow of important 
new information, and very flexible methods of estimation are needed for this purpose. 
The highly flexible methods can be more powerful in simple form 
than the more complicated procedures that we were following at the 
Cowles Commission. In particular, for an economy where detailed 
information is important, it is preferable to aim for large systems...and 
to handle them by relatively flexible, simple statistical methods instead 
of paying enormous attention to complicated estimation procedures 
for smaller manageable systems...I believe that the spirit of what we were 
trying to achieve in that beginning period can best be reached by statistical methods 
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that are simpler than those that we thought were most powerful at the Cowles 
Commission” (Klein, 1991, pp. 115-116, my emphasis). 
 
Klein’s appeal to institutional reality and his ‘methodological structuralism’ 
Klein’s methodology also marks an important contrast with the Cowles’s. Nell and 
Errouaki (2013) have labelled Klein’s appealing methodology as methodological 
structuralism22. Contrasting with the Cowles’s methodological individualism, Klein’s 
methodological structuralism does not necessarily start with the individual as the one 
and only unit of analysis. Klein recognizes the existence of the individual, of course, 
and understands that her behaviour affects the economy in a way or another. But 
Klein’s focus is on the discovery of the underlying structure of the economy. He 
understands that it is the social and economic institutions, which constitute the most 
fundamental pieces of this underlying structure. 
“[Klein] approach[es] the explanation of economic events in terms of 
a social world made up of institutions, roles, responsibilities, powers 
and so on...[and] considers the socio-economic system to be made up 
of ‘structured objects’ whose powers exist independently of our 
knowledge or perception...The policeman has the power to arrest us, and 
the President has the power to call up the National Guard, whether we 
know it or not. These objects, relationships, powers and duties 
constitute the basis of the causal relationships that economic science 
describes. Employers can hire and fire workers and can order them 
around; firms can move capital from place to place opening and 
closing plants” (Nell and Errouaki, 2013, p. 430, my emphasis) 
But the examples that Nell and Errouaki provide could be also applicable from the 
perspective of methodological individualism: the policeman could individually decide 
to arrest us, or the president could call the National Guard just as a result of some kind 
of individual decision. What is relevant here is that the structure of the economy (and 
society) provides a special kind of power to particular organizations and individuals. It is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 In fact, Nell and Errouaki (2013) have treated Klein’s methodology as if it presented no significant 
difference with the Cowles’s methodology. Their claim is that the structural econometrics programme 
at Cowles was in the “right” way, and that econometrics today should take again this track and come 
back to the structural econometrics programme (ibid). My aim is not to appraise whether Nell and 
Errouaki’s claim is just or not, nor is it to say what econometricians should do today, for I am not 
trying to do any kind of normative statement about econometrics. From a historical point of view, 
however, I disagree with Nell and Errouaki (2013) in their intention of bringing the Cowles and Klein’s 
methodology to a common level. I think that they wrongly equalise Klein’s position with that of the 
Cowles. Nell and Errouaki take Haavelmo’s position as if it were the Cowles’s official stand. Yet, even 
if Haavelmo visited the Cowles for a few years, and even if he developed his 1944 paper during his 
time there (Bjerkholt, 2007), Haavelmo does not represent the Cowles’s official position. It is rather 
Marschak and Koopmans who, as research directors, better represent the Cowles’s official position. 
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not that the employer optimises her choice, but that she has the power to hire or fire, 
while the employee has no power at all to keep her job or to get a new one, whether 
her choice is the result of a process of optimisation or not. In short, taking into account 
the powers, institutions, rules, responsibilities and roles of the individuals in the 
economy and society, economists would count with more (relevant) information to find 
out about the world, which would be very valuable in the building of their econometric 
models.23 
In order to improve her model, the researcher has the possibility (or the duty) of 
introducing more accurate a priori information into the mathematical model, which 
reflexes, for example, the relation of power between the employers and the employees 
in the labour market. A priori information is a kind of knowledge about the economy 
as a whole and “is [therefore] independent of the particular sample being used 
[and]...may consist of economic theory, a knowledge of economic institutions, a 
knowledge of technology, or empirical results from independent samples” (Klein, 1957, 
p. 2). 
A priori information stemming from “knowledge of technology” means that some 
improvement could be attaint by the development and refinement of more 
sophisticated methods of statistical inference. As I have already evoked, the 
improvement of this kind of knowledge would be much closer to the line of research of 
the Cowles Commission. Klein did not think that these technical improvements would 
be decisive for the advancement of econometrics. He rather thought that it was the 
improvement of institutional reality and the refinement of data, which would decisively 
contribute to the improvement of econometric modelling: 
“The building of institutional reality into a priori formulations of 
economic reality and the refinement of basic data collection have 
contributed much more to the improvement of empirical econometric 
results than have more elaborate methods of statistical inference” 
(Klein, 1960, p. 867). 
Klein did not just defend his intuitive idea, which prayed that “the more that relevant 
information is used, the better are estimates that make use of it” (Klein, 1985, p. 8). He 
actually found a formal way of expressing and demonstrating that the use of more 
relevant a priori information would render the estimators statistically more efficient. 
To show his result he came back to a concept he had learned from his PhD thesis 
director, Paul Samuelson: Samuelson’s principle of Le Chatelier.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Nell and Errouaki (2013) argue that Klein’s methodological structuralism would overlap Nell’s 
methodological institutionalism. “Both approach the explanation of economic events in terms of a 
social world made up of institutions, roles, responsibilities, powers, and so on” (ibid, p. 430). 
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“Samuelson showed that the equilibrium values of the diagonal 
elements of a certain matrix of bordered second-order derivatives of a 
consumer’s utility function become smaller and smaller as more 
restrictions are placed on the maximization of the utility function…He 
showed in effect that price sensitivity (elasticity) is reduced as 
additional restrictions are imposed… I [Klein] noticed that there was an 
analogy between the matrices of second-order derivatives in utility theory and in 
maximum likelihood theory for econometric estimation…As a priori information is 
added, the bordering increases and the estimation-efficiency measures improve” 
(Klein, 1985, p. 8 my emphasis). 
Klein had seen the difficulties of applying the estimation methods of the Cowles 
Commission in everyday econometrics. He had also recognized that these methods did 
not throw clearly superior results than more pedestrian methods like the OLS (Klein, 
1950; 1955). Even if Klein tried to praise the methods developed at Cowles during his 
stay at the Cowles Commission, it was clear for him that practical and applied 
problems proved that more pedestrian methods were at least as effective as the more 
sophisticated methods (ibid). Klein thought that econometrics was a matter of 
understanding the economy, and this better understanding of the economy had to be 
reflected in the integration of institutional reality in the mathematical construction of 
the econometric models. 
The implementation of structural macroeconometric models in a particular country 
provides a good example of the importance of taking into account institutional reality. 
Klein was aware of the fact that every country wanting to build a macroeconometric 
model, should undertake a serious study of the particular way in which its economic 
and social institutions really worked. Long before he embarked into Project LINK24, 
Klein recognized that there were particular institutional factors typical of every 
country that must be taken into account, in order to build adequate and sound models. 
“A workable model must be dynamic and institutional; it must reflect 
processes through time, and it must take into account the main 
institutional factors affecting the working of any particular system. 
Different features must be built into adequate models of such diverse 
economies as the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan, 
the Netherlands, etc. Models of non- capitalistic societies will differ 
even more radically from the models of capitalist countries, with 
investment not an endogenous magnitude” (Klein, 1954, p. 279). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Project LINK started in 1968 and was initially founded by the Rockefeller Foundation. It “sought to 
integrate the macroeconometric models of different countries, which eventually included Third World 
countries and socialist nations, into a total simultaneous system” (Mariano, 2008, p. 8). For a more 
comprehensive account of Project LINK see (Bodkin et al., 1991). 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.80
	   24	  
Concluding Remarks 
Lawrence R. Klein conceived econometrics as a pluralistic scientific tool for economic 
planning.  As a pluralistic tool, econometrics could integrate different (and sometimes 
conflicting) theories and hypotheses, providing the possibility of better understanding 
and intervening the economy. Intervention should, according to Klein, go beyond the 
reforms of the capitalist system; intervention should be carried on in order to really 
change the economic system, and its underlying structures of power. The daily practice 
of econometrics would imply a field of applied and theoretical research characterised 
by a great deal of teamwork and discussion, not only because of the technical 
impediments of the 1940s and 1950s, but also in the computer era where calculations 
should not be a problem (Klein and Mariano, 1987). Econometrics would also be a 
discipline characterised by a lot of tinkering and thinking, crossing the boundaries 
between theoretical and applied work in economics, statistics and mathematics, and 
also between history and politics. As a method of inquiry, the scientific practice of 
econometric modelling, would provide the possibility for economists to find out about the 
world.  
 
Klein did not just “look” at the model in order to learn from it; while building and 
manipulating the model, Klein was tinkering, thinking, adjusting, discussing and 
thinking again25. On the one hand, Klein’s openness towards Neoclassical, Keynesian 
and Marxian economic theory played an important role in the building of his models, 
providing him with the possibility of enriching his hypotheses and of specifying his 
model equations in various ways. Also his methodological structuralism and his taking 
into account of institutional reality proved much more flexible and more applicable to 
a variety of contexts, than the more rigid methodological individualism promoted at 
Cowles. On the other hand, Klein promoted the idea that macroeconometric 
modelling was not a “once-and-for-all-job” (Klein, 1950; 1955), but rather a practice 
consisting on the rethinking, re-discussing, re-specification and re-estimation of the 
models, and on the inclusion of new relevant institutional information and data. 
 
In a nutshell, two elements characterised Klein’s image of econometrics. Klein not 
only softened the rigid econometric approach from the Cowles, making it less 
theoretical and more familiar to the reality of economists’ practices; he also enriched 
the econometric approach by introducing elements of institutional reality in his models, 
rendering econometric modelling not only a tool ready to intervene in the economy, 
but also a practice allowing to find out about economic relations and phenomena. 
These elements made of Klein’s image of econometrics an image capable of being 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Klein’s way of handling the practice of econometric modelling might be close to Morgan and 
Morrison’s (1999) description: “we learn…from building and from manipulating [the model]” (p. 12), 
rather than just from looking at the model. 
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disseminated throughout the economics community, revealing econometrics as a 
powerful scientific tool, applicable to all economic streams (main or not), providing 
some standards of how to actually undertake econometric studies. In short, Klein’s 
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